1 Jan 2009 20:39
Re: [Cfrg] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue CAcertificate
Ben Laurie <ben <at> links.org>
2009-01-01 19:39:54 GMT
2009-01-01 19:39:54 GMT
Santosh Chokhani wrote: > We must fix X.509 since it is not broken. I am not suggesting that we should fix X.509, I am pointing out, in my own roundabout way, that X.509 certs are supposed to have a canonical form. But it seems they do not. Makes me wonder why we go to all the effort of using a supposedly canonical encoding that isn't? If we can only rely on the original bits in the cert when checking the signature, why bother? -- -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html http://www.links.org/ "There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff
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