3 Dec 2002 12:47
Re: OCSP I-Ds going forward
Phillip H. Griffin <phil.griffin <at> asn-1.com>
2002-12-03 11:47:20 GMT
2002-12-03 11:47:20 GMT
Peter, Your point of being able to handle broken DNs is a very good one. The relative complexity of DNs compared to a simple hash, and the historic ability of coders to get DNs wrong begs for one easy way to match certificates. Compact is a good reason too, and the hash provides a fixed length search key, and complexity that does not vary with the number of DN components, their order, or whether a given attribute is absent or present or appears more than once. A hash approach does not require writing, testing, documenting and maintaining all of the programming logic needed to handle DN complexity. And a hash doesn't care what type or version of certificate is used, whether it's encoded in DER or XER, or whether it even has a DN. Phil Peter Gutmann wrote: big snip > >- Universal and unambiguous (uniquely identifies a cert even if (just to keep > Steve Kent happyit has a broken DN). > >- Compact enough to work in bandwidth-constrained or resource-limited > environments. > >- Easy to get right, to avoid the problems experienced with the v1 ID. > >The only ID which seems to meet these requirements is certHash. As I said in >my previous message, I don't care what else you stick in there, as long as I >can ship code which I know will work with any other (v2-aware) implementation. > >Peter. > > >
it has a broken DN).
>
>- Compact enough to work in bandwidth-constrained or resource-limited
> environments.
>
>- Easy to get right, to avoid the problems experienced with the v1 ID.
>
>The only ID which seems to meet these requirements is certHash. As I said in
>my previous message, I don't care what else you stick in there, as long as I
>can ship code which I know will work with any other (v2-aware) implementation.
>
>Peter.
>
>
>
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