Condorcet failure of Approval Voting (was Re: Dave reply)

MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:

> ...
>
> [Dave] continued:
>
>     BUT the voter's actions, such as strategy, have to be based on what
> is practical for voters to learn and use (it is too easy for EM members
> to design strategies that sound nice in EM debates, while not practical
> for public election voters to either get the data or process it).
>
> I reply:
>
> Of course we're very aware of that. That's why our favorite Approval 
> strategy to tell people is:
>
> Vote for whom you would in Plurality, and for everyone whom you like 
> better.
>
> That's not complicated, but it's perfectly good for maximizing 
> expectation in Approval, and for quicklyl homing in on the CW. 

It's better than Plurality in this regard, but not perfect.

For example:

2: Bush>Perot>Clinton  (approval vote = Bush)
1: Perot>Bush>Clinton  (approval vote = Bush + Perot)
2: Clinton>Perot>Bush  (approval vote = Clinton)

The approval vote totals are:

Bush: 3
Clinton: 2
Perot: 1

and so Bush wins.  But Perot is the Condorcet winner!
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