Re: Peirce predisposed to naturalistic solutions?, was RE: Inquiry and the categories etc.

Dear Ben,

I did answer your questions, but perhaps too tersely.

When I speak of "nature" I refer to that which arises from primitive  
aspects of the world - I take energy-mass, space-time, and the  
primitive of experience to be those primitive aspects. The general  
principles that shape the world, and are operative in it, include  
gravity, the engineering of sentience, and natural selection.

When I speak of "constructive" I am referring to natural construction  
of the world AND to our approximation of that construction in our  
constructive scientific knowledge. When I refer to "naturalistic  
solutions" I am referring to the rejection of the supernatural  
(anything unfounded in natural solutions), our historical, perhaps  
inevitable, refinement of that approximation so that it better  
approximate the true workings of nature.

I have already indicated that in my view epistemology has a natural  
basis - and, in particular, that anthorpogenic knowledge is the  
product of the engineering of sentience. Included in that category is  
philosophy and mathematics.

In terms of apprehension I have made reference to those things that  
can be known, but do not have ontological status in the world beyond  
their apprehension - and I deliberately refer to televisions and  
irrational numbers as examples of this. Televisions, incidently, are  
mere assemblies of parts apprehended as "televisions" - a television  
is a thing that can be "known" (apprehended) but that does not exist  
in the world. The same is true of irrational numbers and other  
infinities.

This observation I extend to all relations, relations are things that  
can be known, but they are not things that exist in the world. For me  
they are products of the engineering of sentience - manifest in the  
mechanics of biophysics (according to my model). Hence, our  
development of mathematics is founded upon this engineering. This  
view could, perhaps, be called the view of strict ontological  
independence - that is, things that have ontological status are  
strictly independent and relations are subjects of apprehension alone.

As to the properties of mathematics - such as the distribution of  
primes you mention - these are valuable and interesting self  
indulgences whose exploration is part and parcel of our refinement of  
our apprehension of the world and the development of our  
understanding of nature through the biophysical process that is  
semeiosis.

I think you are confused about the definition of idioscopy - you  
appear to be giving it some poetic properties Peirce did not intend.

Sincerely,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
http://senses.info

On Jun 4, 2007, at 2:41 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

> ...

> Bolding the word "natural" doesn't clarify it. At this point I'm  
> unsure what you mean by "natural" and what you mean by basing  
> things on "naturalistic solutions."   I've asked you the following  
> questions, most of them twice, and now a third time --
> - What, in pragmatic clarity,would it mean to base generals,  
> universals, mathematics, etc., on naturalistic solutions?
> -- Would it be simply something that one says in philosophy? Would  
> it have any consequences in research outside philosophy?
> -- Do you see a path to where nature answers questions about  
> mathematics other than though human brains or the like which very  
> specially arrange for - themselves to be determined and influenced  
> by considerations about highly abstract nonlinguistic objects?
> -- Or do you hold that mathematical studies should change in order  
> to be more pertinent to natural questions in the first place?
> -- Are you uncertain about the pragmatic meaning of basing  
> generals, mathematics, etc., on naturalistic solutions?
>
> ...

>
> Now, when Peirce was discussing idioscopic questions, he sought  
> idioscopic answers. When he discussed general questions about  
> psycho-physical nature, he sought general answers in terms of  
> psycho-physical nature. By your reasoning, his general discussions  
> of phenomenology would have to be taken as evidence that he wanted  
> to base math and everything else on philosophical phenomenological  
> solutions.

> ...

> you point to his identification of matter with effete mind, and  
> ignore the breadth of that which he called idioscopy, embracing  
> special-scientific questions both of the physical and of the  
> psychical. You also ignore the fact that he has matter originating  
> in mind.
>

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