5 Jun 2007 01:17
Re: Peirce predisposed to naturalistic solutions?, was RE: Inquiry and the categories etc.
Steven Ericsson-Zenith <steven <at> semeiosis.org>
2007-06-04 23:17:18 GMT
2007-06-04 23:17:18 GMT
Dear Ben, I did answer your questions, but perhaps too tersely. When I speak of "nature" I refer to that which arises from primitive aspects of the world - I take energy-mass, space-time, and the primitive of experience to be those primitive aspects. The general principles that shape the world, and are operative in it, include gravity, the engineering of sentience, and natural selection. When I speak of "constructive" I am referring to natural construction of the world AND to our approximation of that construction in our constructive scientific knowledge. When I refer to "naturalistic solutions" I am referring to the rejection of the supernatural (anything unfounded in natural solutions), our historical, perhaps inevitable, refinement of that approximation so that it better approximate the true workings of nature. I have already indicated that in my view epistemology has a natural basis - and, in particular, that anthorpogenic knowledge is the product of the engineering of sentience. Included in that category is philosophy and mathematics. In terms of apprehension I have made reference to those things that can be known, but do not have ontological status in the world beyond their apprehension - and I deliberately refer to televisions and irrational numbers as examples of this. Televisions, incidently, are mere assemblies of parts apprehended as "televisions" - a television is a thing that can be "known" (apprehended) but that does not exist in the world. The same is true of irrational numbers and other infinities. This observation I extend to all relations, relations are things that can be known, but they are not things that exist in the world. For me they are products of the engineering of sentience - manifest in the mechanics of biophysics (according to my model). Hence, our development of mathematics is founded upon this engineering. This view could, perhaps, be called the view of strict ontological independence - that is, things that have ontological status are strictly independent and relations are subjects of apprehension alone. As to the properties of mathematics - such as the distribution of primes you mention - these are valuable and interesting self indulgences whose exploration is part and parcel of our refinement of our apprehension of the world and the development of our understanding of nature through the biophysical process that is semeiosis. I think you are confused about the definition of idioscopy - you appear to be giving it some poetic properties Peirce did not intend. Sincerely, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering http://iase.info http://senses.info On Jun 4, 2007, at 2:41 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > ... > Bolding the word "natural" doesn't clarify it. At this point I'm > unsure what you mean by "natural" and what you mean by basing > things on "naturalistic solutions." I've asked you the following > questions, most of them twice, and now a third time -- > - What, in pragmatic clarity,would it mean to base generals, > universals, mathematics, etc., on naturalistic solutions? > -- Would it be simply something that one says in philosophy? Would > it have any consequences in research outside philosophy? > -- Do you see a path to where nature answers questions about > mathematics other than though human brains or the like which very > specially arrange for - themselves to be determined and influenced > by considerations about highly abstract nonlinguistic objects? > -- Or do you hold that mathematical studies should change in order > to be more pertinent to natural questions in the first place? > -- Are you uncertain about the pragmatic meaning of basing > generals, mathematics, etc., on naturalistic solutions? > > ... > > Now, when Peirce was discussing idioscopic questions, he sought > idioscopic answers. When he discussed general questions about > psycho-physical nature, he sought general answers in terms of > psycho-physical nature. By your reasoning, his general discussions > of phenomenology would have to be taken as evidence that he wanted > to base math and everything else on philosophical phenomenological > solutions. > ... > you point to his identification of matter with effete mind, and > ignore the breadth of that which he called idioscopy, embracing > special-scientific questions both of the physical and of the > psychical. You also ignore the fact that he has matter originating > in mind. > --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber gspp-peirce-l <at> m.gmane.org