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From: Marcos Silva <marcossilvarj-8a+P9i1ojmF8zQARNC3f2A <at> public.gmane.org>
Subject: CFP: Philosophy of Non-Classical Logics (Istanbul, 25-30 Jun, 2015)
Newsgroups: gmane.science.philosophy.region.europe
Date: Sunday 14th September 2014 15:41:01 UTC (over 4 years ago)
*Philosophy of non-classical logics:*

*Toward problems of paraconsistency & paracompleteness*

*Workshop organized by*

*Marcos Silva <http://ufc.academia.edu/MarcosSilva>*

*(Federal University of Ceará, Fortaleza, Brazil)*


*Ingolf Max

*(University of Leipzig, Germany)*

Keynote speaker: Graham Priest (CUNY)

There is an ongoing philosophical and logical debate about motivations in
accepting or rejecting the principle (law) of (non-)contradiction and the
principle (law) of excluded middle. A logic rejecting the principle of
non-contradiction is called *paraconsistent* and a logic rejecting the
principle of excluded middle is called *paracomplete*. If both principles
are duals of each other we have some reason to reject both principles and
get *paranormal* systems. But what does it really mean to reject a
classical principle (law)? And what are the philosophical consequences for
this refusal? In which sense would it still be possible to defend nowadays
there is just one true logic, if we have such a great diversity of logics?

Among the famous logical systems which are paraconsistent but not
paracomplete are, for instance, the da Costa systems. Intuitionist logics
are paracomplete but not paraconsistent. And a lot of systems of relevant
logic are paraconsistent as well as paracomplete. To evaluate these
systems’ philosophical relevance, we have to *inter alia* examine the
logical form of their atomic formulas, the logical behavior of their
negation, conjunction and disjunction as well as the properties of logical
consequence relations. From a philosophical point of view it is very
important to understand which elements are responsible for such deviations
from classical logic. E.g., do we have only *local* reasons? In the case of
Jaśkowski's version of paraconsistent logic we have to change the
conjunction. In the da Costa systems mainly negation is under attack. Or do
we have *global* reasons like in systems of first degree entailments?
(Belnap, Dunn, Priest). What is the position of paracomplete, intuitionist
approaches (Brouwer, Heyting and their followers)?

This workshop shall represent a privileged platform to evaluate proposals
for a more integrated and general approach to philosophical motivations and
consequences in the emergence of non-classical logics.

*Call for papers*

Topics may include:

·  logical monism & logical pluralism

·  philosophical motivations for creating non-classical logics
anti-realism, relevantism etc.)

·  local vs. global and formal vs. application-oriented reasons for
paraconsistency and/or paracompleteness

·  non-explosiveness of logical consequence

·  trivialization strategies and classical logic

·  philosophy of contradiction and inconsistency (Hegel, Wittgenstein,
Meinong, Heraclites, Indian Philosophy etc.)

·  philosophy of constructivism (Poincaré, Brouwer, Heyting, Kolmogorov,
Wittgenstein, Lorenzen, Dummett, Prawitz etc.)

·  philosophical relations between paraconsistency and paracompleteness

Abstracts (500 words maximum) should be sent via e-mail before November
2014 to:

*[email protected]g 

Notification of acceptance: December 1st 2014

Intended day for our workshop: June 27th, 2015

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