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From: massimiliano carrara <massimiliano.carrara-3RUGAeSMUS4 <at> public.gmane.org>
Subject: Workshop "Gaps, Gluts, and Truth" Padua (Italy)
Newsgroups: gmane.science.philosophy.region.europe
Date: Tuesday 14th May 2013 17:16:35 UTC (over 5 years ago)
Cogito - Research Centre in Philosophy
Project: Philosophy of Mathematics and Philosophy of Logic

University of Padua - Doctoral School in Philosophy (curriculum
Theoretical Philosophy)


23 May 2013


FISPPA Department -- University of Padua
Sala delle Edicole
P.zza Capitaniato 3, Padua (Italy)


Workshop "Gaps, Gluts, and Truth"



10.30 - 11.40


Pablo Cobreros
Universidad de Navarra (Navarra, Spain)

Title: Symmetry, Gaps and Gluts

Abstract: Vagueness and the Liar paradox lead to a symmetry related
situations that cannot be handled within classical semantics. In the
case of vagueness, borderline cases lead to a symmetry of dispositions
of competent speakers towards assertion and denial. In the case of the
Liar, there is a symmetry in truth-value between the Liar sentence and
its negation. Three-valued strong kleene semantics is a natural way to
liberalize classical semantics. But then a second symmetry arises:
should we read the intermediate value as a gap or as a glut?



11.45 - 12.55

Boris Rähme
Fondazione Bruno Kessler (Trento, Italy)


Title: An explanatory use of the concept of truth

Abstract: A central claim of deflationary accounts of truth for
propositions is that truth talk has no explanatory role to play in
philosophical elucidations of our epistemic and discursive practices.
(An analogous claim is brought forward by disquotationalists, i.e. by
proponents of deflationary accounts of truth for sentences. I will
concentrate on deflationism about propositional truth.) In my talk I
scrutinize the no-explanatory-role claim with respect to the following
normative constraint on the speech act of assertion:

(N) It is correct to assert a proposition only if it is true.

Deflationists argue that the truth talk involved in (N) plays a purely
generalizing role and justify this claim by pointing out that the
content of particular instances of (N), say,

(T+) [It is correct to assert the proposition that some dogs are
vicious] only if the proposition that some dogs are vicious is true.

can be expressed equally well without appeal to truth:

(T-) [It is correct to assert that some dogs are vicious] only if some
dogs are vicious.

While conceding this last point to the deflationist, I argue that the
particular ‘true’-free instances of (N) themselves stand in need of
explanation and that the only candidate explanation in the offing is
in terms of truth. The main thesis of my talk is, then, that the
no-explanatory-role claim deprives deflationists about (propositional)
truth of the resources to answer the following simple question: Why
does (T-) hold good? After arguing that (T-) does indeed hold good, I
discuss and dismiss several rejoinders that deflationists might level
at my argument.


14.30 - 15.40

Martin Vacek
Slovak Academy of Sciences (Bratislava, Slovakia)

Title: Dialetheism and Metaphysics

Abstract: In the paper, I take logical laws to be entrenched in
reality itself rather than in human conventions. Secondly, I discuss
how such a robust realist conception of logical laws captures the
logical complexity of concrete (possible and impossible) worlds. It
will be shown that it is the structural properties of a world that
give us its logical laws. If so, the theory of concrete possible
worlds instantiating various metaphysical structures enables us to
non-modally differentiate between logically distinct worlds and, by
the same reasoning, determines which worlds are impossible.


15.45 - 16.55

Sebastiano Moruzzi
University of Bologna (Bologna, Italy)

Title: Vagueness and Omniscience

Abstract: The paper explores the consequences of the notion of
omniscience in relation to the problem of vagueness.
Omniscience is an idealised notion: it is the condition according to
which a thinker knows everything there is to know. 1 In the context of
the debate on vagueness, omniscience can appear to be a loosely
related topic. If we grant the logical possibility of a thinker who
knows everything there is to know, an epistemicist might grant that
vague boundaries would be known to such a thinker, while a theorist
who believes vague predicates are boundaryless would hold that this
latter knowledge is foreclosed even to an omniscient thinker. In this
paper I will deal with the latter position, i.e. with the idea that
vague predicates lack sharp boundaries.However, things are more
complicated than what they appear to at first glance. Before drawing
conclusions on this issue, the exact relation between indeterminacy,
knowledge and omniscience must be clarified.
I start introducing and motivating the relevance of omniscience to
vagueness in relation to the supervaluationist approach. Two basic
principles which relate vagueness to indeterminacy and knowledge are
stated, and three definitions of omniscience are considered. I raise
problems for all these definitions. Finally, I suggest that we are not
in a position to know that omniscience is possible; we too easily come
to accept the idea that omniscience is possible because of a
misapprehension of the phenomenology of vagueness.


Organization: Massimiliano Carrara (University of Padua -- Cogito -
Research Centre in Philosophy)
[email protected]

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